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THE HOBBESIAN ROOTS OF 
CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 
Robert Westmoreland 
Contemporary liberalism celebrates itself as founded on a deep respect for 
the unique worth of persons. Though it does not assume any non-naturalistic 
conception of persons of the sort characteristic of the Judeo-Christian or 
Kantian traditions, neither does it typically claim to deny such conceptions; 
in fact liberalism professes a neutrality toward all non-harmful ways of life, 
including theistic religions, motivated by its respect for persons. I argue that 
in theory and practice an influential strand of contemporary liberalism both 
assumes a conception of persons which is Hobbesian in inspiration and man-
ifests Hobbes' hostility toward religion. 
Few discoveries are more irritating than those which expose the pedigree of 
ideas.-Lord Acton l 
Contemporary liberalism often celebrates itself as founded on a recognition 
of the unique worth of persons. It does not assume the non-naturalistic view 
of persons of either Christianity or Kant, but it claims not to reject it either; 
it allows no judgments about the worth of various ways of life to affect the 
state's distribution of goods, but it claims not to be founded on the assumption 
that none is worthier than another; though it forbids the state to prefer one 
religion to another or religion to irreligion, it professes not to assume or 
promote a secular world view. This essay questions these assumptions, and 
argues that a very influential strand of liberalism, one that typically claims 
to be as tolerant of theistic religions, including Christianity, as of any other 
way of life that does no injustice to others, is really Hobbesian in inspiration 
and hostile to religion, Christianity in particular. I do not try to set out a 
political theory or conception of justice that uniquely realizes Christian ideals 
as they apply to political life: there may well be no such theory, and if there 
is, it cannot be limned in a brief essay. Nor do I claim that all forms of 
liberalism share the tendencies I describe. I only float the hypothesis that a 
certain package of political commitments which I trust most would call liberal 
appears to constitute an intellectual system rather than an entirely contingent 
collection of discrete beliefs on the assumption that it manifests a particular 
way of looking at the world articulated first by Hobbes. 
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1. Hobbesian Liberalism 
For Hobbes men are rational animals, but in a very different sense from 
Aristotle or St. Thomas. There is no final end for reason to apprehend; the 
"end" we seek is "felicity" or "Continuall successe in obtaining those things 
which a man from time to time desireth."2 Judgments about what is good (as 
opposed to what is right) give voice only to subjective preferences. Free will 
is merely the capacity to act on one's desires unhindered by any outside force. 
Nevertheless reason bestows a character on human appetites very different 
from that of other animals. Other organisms reflexively pursue desires caused 
by objects of their immediate environment; men and women pursue objects 
entertained in imagination as well as those immediately present. Human 
appetite is thus peculiarly insatiable. Reason counsels the accumulation by 
each, for reasons of assurance, of goods beyond the needs of the moment and 
so invites competitive deadlock. More fundamentally, reason gives rise to 
consciousness of self, and so to the passion of pride. Each desires above all 
preeminence, and to be recognized as preeminent. His greatest joy "consisteth 
in comparing himselfe with other men," and he "can relish nothing but what 
is eminent."3 
The passion of pride inevitably generates the fear of being outdone by 
others, for the race for precedence is necessarily a zero-sum game; unlike the 
competition for material goods, it cannot increase the availability of the good 
desired. In fact reason recognizes any hope of sustained preeminence as 
vainglorious, for superiority arouses envy and perpetual struggle which ends 
in the ultimate affront to pride, violent or shameful death at the hands of a 
competitor. Reason thus counsels the pursuit of peace even at the expense of 
precedence. The price of peace is the ab:mdonment of the quest for victory 
and submission in common to a sovereign whose authority is absolute; though 
a product of the covenant, he is not party to it, since contractors have obli-
gations (Le., limits to their rightful power) and prior to the creation of the 
sovereign there is no morality, hence no obligation. Justice, the unfeigned 
endeavor for peace, is the highest virtue, and it amounts to obedience to the 
sovereign who through the law defines the terms of the pursuit of peace. 
As justice is the highest moral virtue, and the other moral virtues are 
desirable only because they conduce to peace,4 no more sense attaches to the 
notion of the good or noble life in the commonwealth than in the state of 
nature. Courage is a passion rather than a virtueS, as is any other disposition 
which makes for the strong and definite characters that might threaten social 
peace. Unlike those passions such as fear which move men to seek peace, 
courage "enclineth men to private Revenges, and sometimes to endeavor the 
unsettling of the Publique Peace."6 The morality of Leviathan is, in the words 
of Michael Oakeshott, "the morality of the tame man. "7 Men and women enter 
the commonwealth, not to seek virtue in the Aristotelian or Thomistic sense, 
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but to pursue a "commodious" life. 8 This is reflected in certain rights the 
citizen retains in the commonwealth. Though they do not impose correlative 
duties on anyone else-the sovereign has no duties, the duties of citizens are 
creations of the sovereign-they are rights in that their exercise does no 
injustice and individuals cannot be expected to forego them. Resistance to 
punishment-"Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment,"9 as well as capital 
punishment-is not unjust, nor is flight from the battlefield, regardless of the 
cause of war. The point of the commonwealth is "the procuration of the safety 
of the people," by which "is not meant a bare Preservation" but also "all other 
Contentments of life. "10 The commonwealth is not the terror state some critics 
think; as Frank Coleman argues in Hobbes and America, coercion (as opposed 
to the threat of coercion) represents the failure of the sovereign, since the 
natural right to resist imprisonment or death is retained in the common-
wealth. II 
A certain conception of equality attends this idea of the commonwealth. 
Claims of superiority are dangerous as well as empty, for they kindle the 
passion of pride, which the sovereign is called to crush. The sovereign is 
"compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the last two verses of 
the one and the fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power 
of Leviathan, called him King of the Proud."12 Differences between individ-
uals are said to pale before their essential equality. Even the strongest can be 
killed by the weak, which shows the insignificance of differences in individ-
ual power. Hobbes is especially anxious to establish intellectual equality, for 
he thinks that men and women take greatest pride in the supposed superiority 
of their intelligence. Thus he argues that the contentment of each with his 
intellect evidences substantial equality (no doubt a disingenuous argument in 
light of his views about our tendency to vainglory).13 An attitude of superi-
ority invites strife. As individual differences pale before our common suscep-
tibility to shameful death, we should consider each other equals. 14 
Hobbes' conception of the commodious life and of equality illuminates his 
view of then-nascent capitalism. He finds peaceable the middle class's desire 
to obtain the prerequisites of a commodious life "by their Industry. "15 He 
acknowledges the importance of the "Liberty to buy, sell, and otherwise 
contract with one another."16 A person's "Labour also, is a commodity ex-
changeable for benefit, as well as any other thing."17 Industry and frugality 
increase "the public stock, which cannot be too great for the public use. "18 
In sum, the pursuit of modest self-enrichment within a legal framework cre-
ated by the sovereign would seem to dissipate the acquisitive energies of the 
individual peaceably while incidentally enriching the commonwealth. It is 
acceptable on those grounds. 
Hobbes would appear to be an apologist for the free market; yet he is also 
its mordant critic. Those who have enriched themselves "by craft and trade" 
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are so blind that they do not see that their real interest lies in obedience to 
the sovereign. 19 Though market society condemns sins of the flesh, it tolerates 
"the lucrative vices of men of trade or handicraft. "20 Friendship has no deeper 
basis than commercial value.21 The notion that one's market price determines 
one's value, and that to value a man "at a low rate, is to Dishonour him,"22 
would seem an invitation to instability, for it threatens, not just poverty, but 
the acute pain of loss to one's competitors. 
Accompanying this portrait of the commercial classes is a deep and general 
skepticism about grown or evolved institutions like the market. Hobbes' 
radical critique of the common law wholly rejects the idea that, in the words 
of Chief Justice Hale, "Long experience makes more discoveries touching 
conveniences or inconveniencies of laws than is possible for the wisest coun-
cil of men at first to foresee. "23 There is no accumulated wisdom to be found 
in histories, which if anything sow discord; those who consult them for 
political guidance are like those who would say, because men always "lay 
the foundation of their houses on the sand," that it ought to be thus.24 The 
constructivist method of contract is the only guide to a peaceful common-
wealth. In general, social order is the product, not of custom and tradition 
embodied in social morality, markets, and the common law, but of central 
direction, despite the role of commerce in dissipating the otherwise violent 
energies of self-seeking individuals. 
The institution which the sovereign must take most care to reign in for the 
sake of peace is the church. Hobbes is not the Promethean sort of atheist who 
believes that religion prevents the realization of autonomy. Rather religion 
inflames passions that threaten peace. The idea of God as anything but a bare 
first cause is the product of human desire.2s The doctrine of salvation through 
faith gives rise to sectarian passions, and invites presumptions of superiority 
on the part of those who make claims of revelation. The solution of the 
religious problem is not to abolish the church but to domesticate it, to make 
sure it does not disturb the commodious life.26 
The portrait of the Hobbesian man that has emerged above is of one who 
pursues his own good in his own way, resents those who appear superior in 
any way, and is chary of judging others for fear of exciting envy or resent-
ment. Though he has not lost his competitive inclinations, he recognizes the 
need to subordinate them; he has made his peace with the idea that security, 
freedom, and release from the anguish of the race for precedence are goods 
outweighing glory. He is wholly without illusions: He sees through claims of 
superiority, and probably prefers the frivolous sensual man who is peaceable 
to the one of courage and passionate commitment to some ideal of life, 
whether Christian or Aristotelian. His tepid loyalty to the commonwealth 
springs from its ability to provide him with the facilities to pursue his own 
good in his own way. For him religion is only the product of passion; he 
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would rather it disappear, except to the extent that it counsels a sort of 
humility which at least resembles the peaceableness of the Hobbesian man, 
though again he lacks the Promethean drive to extirpate it. 
II. Contemporary Liberalism and Religion 
Few contemporary liberals call themselves Hobbesian, and most condemn 
Hobbes' attitude toward religion. They insist that the state treat the religious 
and non-religious alike with equal respect, which is far from the notion that 
religion is a social evil to be tolerated only so far as it conduces to social 
peace. Religious practice which does no immediate harm to identifiable in-
dividuals is said to deserve as much respect and protection as other non-harm-
ful pursuits. Christians in particular are advised to embrace this political 
stance, for their faith demands a free response to grace, not a submission to 
a politically imposed religious orthodoxy. Liberalism claims to oppose Con-
stantinianism, not religion. 
I wonder. Perhaps the most economical way to make the point is to trace 
the career of a certain strain of liberalism through the judicial opinions of 
Justice William Brennan, lionized by many as the incarnation of liberal tol-
erance and neutrality.27 In 1963 the Supreme Court in Abington School Dis-
trict v. Schempp ruled that no legislature "can pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion to another. "28 If "the purpose 
and the primary effect of the enactment. .. is the advancement or inhibition of 
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power." A statute 
or policy is constitutional only if it has a secular purpose "and a primary 
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. "29 This test is certainly not 
hostile to religion. Ten years later, though, in Committee for Public Education 
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, the Court applied the test in a novel way when 
it overturned an amendment to New York's Education and Tax Laws author-
izing state aid for maintenance and repair of private schools and for tuition 
supplements for poor private school students, though this aid was equally 
available to religious and non-religious schools. Since the amendment applied 
only to private schools, which in New York were mostly sectarian, and since 
a qualifying sectarian school might use the funds (e.g.) to repair the school 
chapel rather than for some purely secular purpose, such funding constitutes 
"direct aid"30 to religion and so violates the Schempp test, even though ad-
vancement of the sectarian aim of the school may not be the primary effect 
of the aid. In an opinion joined by Justice Brennan, the Court tackled the 
question whether, since this aid did not discriminate against non-religious 
schools, and since the amendment would "enhance the opportunities of the 
poor to choose between public and non-public education," it would better be 
seen as an attempt to make the Free Exercise Clause more meaningful rather 
than to violate the Establishment Clause. The Court answers that "In its 
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attempt to enhance the opportunities of the poor to choose between public 
and nonpublic education the State has taken a step which can only be regarded 
as one 'advancing' religion. "31 Funding of all schools equally, public and 
private, sectarian and non-sectarian, is construed as an unconstitutional ad-
vancement of religion. Justice Brennan's dissent in Mueller v. Allen32 ten 
years later confirms him in this view. In Mueller the Court upheld a Minne-
sota statute allowing income tax deductions for the cost of tuition, supplies, 
and transportation of pre-college students. The Court held that such assistance 
was neutral since (unlike the aid ruled unconstitutional in Nyquist) it was 
available to the parents of public as well as private school students, and since 
state tax law permitted deductions for a variety of expenses. The financial 
benefit to religious schools was judged too attenuated to raise serious Estab-
lishment Clause issues. Justice Brennan dissented, claiming of course viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman (Justice Brennan concurring), the Court struck down 
state statutes providing for reimbursement for the cost of teachers' salaries 
and instructional materials "in specified secular subjects. "33 There was no 
evidence that any of these were diverted to courses having a religious orien-
tation; by the test of Schempp, such aid does not violate the Establishment 
Clause. Nevertheless the court ruled that such funding of sectarian schools 
was potentially divisive enough to threaten "the normal political process" and 
to "confuse and obscure other issues of great urgency."34 Justice Brennan 
advanced this Lemon principle in his majority opinions in Grand Rapids v. 
Ball3s and Aguilar v. Felton. 36 Ball raised the issue of state funding of reme-
dial classes in secular subjects taught by public school teachers for poor 
parochial school students. Justice Brennan argued that this funding imper-
missibly advanced religion, despite its obviously secular intent, on the ground 
that it might indirectly advance religion by enhancing the diversity and so 
the attractiveness of parochial school curricula, that the teachers might sur-
reptitiously incorporate religious themes in these classes, and that their very 
presence at such schools might be seen, justifiably or not, as state favoritism 
toward religion. 
In Aguilar, the Court overturned a New York City remedial program only 
about ten per cent of whose beneficiaries were parochial school students. The 
program sent public school teachers to parochial schools in order to prevent 
the expense and logistical problems involved in shuttling the students to 
public schools during the school day. The state monitored the classes for 
religious content. It found none, which would seem to allay an important fear 
expressed in Ball. Yet the very supervision provided on Establishment Clause 
grounds was said by Brennan in his majority opinion to constitute an exces-
sive entanglement of church and state. How could supervision intended to 
keep the wall of separation high advance religion? It couldn't; so Brennan, 
HOBBESIAN LIBERALISM 511 
undeterred by the parochial schools' support of the program, argued they 
should be spared the intrusion of state personnel required to monitor the 
classes for excursions into religion. 
Though there are other examples of Justice Brennan's determination to 
raise the wall of separation high, these suffice to illustrate remarkable aspects 
of an interpretation of the First Amendment much admired by many liberals. 
Subsidizing students with no regard to whether they attend public or private, 
religious or non-religious schools is considered, if not actual state promotion 
of religion, resembling such closely enough to threaten social peace. It is 
interesting to juxtapose this view with two other prevalent liberal positions. 
The first is that, though state subsidies for, say, Serrano's Piss Christ might 
smack of promotion of anti-Christian views, free expression considerations 
dictate that, so long as the state chooses to subsidize artists, such work should 
bear no disadvantage in the competition for funds. A similar principle de-
mands that the state increase the worth of various rights deemed fundamental 
by subsidizing the right whenever possible. Thus the state should pay for even 
non-therapeutic abortions for poor women. But it must not subsidize educa-
tion in religious schools even indirectly, and even if the programs subsidized 
are rigorously secular. 
The issue of abortion funding bears on the desire to marginalize religion 
in a more direct way. The American Civil Liberties Union, often pointed to 
as a group that lives the highest ideals of liberalism, fought the Hyde Amend-
ment, whose purpose was to limit sharply federal funding, on the grounds 
that it served no secular purpose. Even though there is no inconsistency 
between atheism and opposition to either permissive abortion laws or state 
subsidies for abortion, the ACLU felt, given the Catholic orientation of many 
pro-life individuals and groups, that the Amendment constituted an unwar-
ranted intrusion of religion into the political realm. Any prohibition of abor-
tion funding was said to violate the Establishment Clause.37 
It is hard not to conclude that the operative principle distinguishing religion 
from "fundamental" rights like abortion is that religion is a product of fantasy 
which inflames passions unconducive to the commodious life, and which thus 
should be reduced to as marginal a status as is feasible. Religious activity is 
to be tolerated only so far as it does not enter into political life in a divisive 
way. In effect this means that, though the church is relatively free, the state 
must do nothing that could be construed as advancing religion even inciden-
tally, and should be especially vigilant not even to appear to lend support to 
religious education. The Supreme Court made the point well when in Tilton 
v. Richardson it justified state aid to religious colleges, despite its decisions 
about aid to religious primary and secondary schools, on the ground that 
"College students are less impressionable to religious doctrine" and that the 
college curricula "tend to limit the opportunities for sectarian influence."38 
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In other words, state aid that benefits religiously oriented schools is justifi-
able only so far as religious instruction in these schools is unlikely to take. 
This view of religious education as making "impressions" and exerting "in-
fluence" primarily on those with immature critical faculties is by all appear-
ances an emotivist one, firmly in the Hobbesian tradition. 
III. Rawlsian Liberalism 
Even if the attitude toward religion just sketched is Hobbesian, it does not 
follow that mainstream liberalism endorses it. No doubt a consistent liberal 
political theory could reject this relationship between church and state. But 
I think many other aspects of the thought and practice of left-of-center lib-
eralism in particular resembles Hobbes enough to suggest that Brennan's 
approach to religion is an organic part of a worldview that is in its essentials 
Hobbesian. 
John Rawls' liberal theory of justice is I think a distillation of this 
world view. This claim might seem false, despite the terse, Hobbesian tone of 
Rawls' "Justice as Fairness,"39 in light of Rawls' conception of individual 
rights as imposing obligations on the state; his claim (in A Theory of Justice, 
if not in his later work) that those rights spring from a Kantian conception 
of persons, at least compatible with Judeo-Christian tradition, on which "Each 
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override,"40 an inviolability based on a conception 
of the moral powers of persons inconsistent with Hobbes' psychological 
egoism; an attendant ideal of a society of free and equal persons each of 
whom agrees to share the fate of the others; the claim that among the basic 
liberties given lexical priority is liberty of religious thought and practice; his 
efforts to free liberalism of dependence on any particular metaphysics; and 
the fact that, unlike the Hobbesian contract situation, which does not 
presuppose conditions of fairness or equality, the point of the original 
position is to free us from heteronomous influences liable to cloud our 
vision of justice. 
A closer look tells a different story. The claim about the Kantian conception 
of persons as inviolable sits uneasily with fundamental aspects of Rawls' 
theory even as articulated in A Theory of Justice. What Rawls offers there is 
not the Kantian view that persons can exercise contra-causal freedom to do 
right in the face of desire, but rather a "procedural rendering of... [Kant ian] 
autonomy" wholly detached from its objectionable "metaphysical surround-
ings. "41 Rawls claims that he means to free liberal justice from any particular 
metaphysics rather than just Kantian dualism. But in A Theory of Justice he 
asserts rather than argues-as a matter of course, I take it, for all grown-up 
liberals-that one's willingness to develop his natural assets by the sweat of 
his brow as well as his possession of those assets are purely the product of 
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a conjunction of fortunate personal and social circumstances, such that dis-
tribution of goods by the state cannot be governed by desert.42 Now Kant, 
who believes that self-control and disciplined effort are only morally admi-
rable if done for the sake of duty, might agree that this sort of effort does not 
typically merit esteem. But nowhere does Rawls show any inclination to 
entertain the possibility of contra-causal freedom, which for Kant is a sine 
qua non of the sort of dutiful action which Kant thinks does deserve esteem; 
this, along with his claim in "The Basic Structure as Subject" that Kantian 
ethics must be restated in empiricist terms43 suggests that every human action 
results from the social and natural lottery (and that Rawls' claim of meta-
physical neutrality is false). Rawls tries to salvage the notion of moral worth, 
which he defines "as having a sense of justice. "44 But moral worth for Kant 
depends on freedom in the strong contra-causal sense, and Rawls' conception 
of persons is shorn of the "objectionable" metaphysical surroundings which 
make sense of such freedom. Rawls' notion of moral worth would seem to 
have only a pragmatic sense; "esteem" could only be a utilitarian-type device 
added to the social environment to induce us to act in accordance with the 
principles of justice. His view that moral worth has "no role in the substantive 
definition of distributive shares"4ss of primary goods fuels this suspicion, as 
do his recent writings about pluralism and about the difference principle, to 
which I now tum. 
That the auspices of Rawlsian justice are more Hobbesian than Kantian, 
and have no reference to dignity or inviolability, is confirmed by some of 
Rawls' recent work. Apparently moved by criticisms about metaphysical as-
sumptions built into A Theory of Justice, Rawls has argued lately that our 
current predicament constrains political theory to pursue agreement on the 
principles of justice based on "political justifications," defined as justifica-
tions that rely on no controversial moral or metaphysical principles. The 
predicament that demands this kind of justification consists in the radical 
pluralism of our moral and political culture, which pluralism is permanent, 
and which only an oppressive state could eliminate.46 The solution of the 
predicament depends, as Jean Hampton says, on the hope that "there are 
numerous possibilities for gain which everyone desires to realize and which 
can only come about when a well-organized and, in particular, stable system 
of social cooperation is established. "47 
These possibilities are realized by means of "political" justifications of 
principles of justice. The idea of a fair decision procedure, of persons as 
equals, and the expression of their equality through the distribution of goods 
prescribed by the two principles of justice, are means to a stable social order 
that does not depend on an oppressive state. The veil of ignorance no longer 
relies on the allegedly individualistic, Kantian notion of persons built into A 
Theory of Justice. From the new Rawlsian perspective the veil is a device for 
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finding principles which will allow diverse individuals and groups to live 
together peacefully. 
The revised Rawlsian project begins to sound much more like a Hobbesian 
modus vivendi than a political expression of individual dignity. Yet Rawls 
insists on an "overlapping consensus" in which citizens regard the principles 
of justice as right and not just instrumentally good, though of course the moral 
theories from which they derive the principles will vary greatly. The "essen-
tial elements of the political conception, its principles, standards and ideals, 
are theorems, as it were, at which the comprehensive doctrines in the con-
sensus interact or converge. "48 The task of political philosophy is to show 
that the principles of justice derive severally from each comprehensive moral 
theory abroad in society, while itself staying neutral among those theories. If 
it works, the new improved political philosophy can achieve the peace the 
old brands aspired to without the pain of moral or metaphysical commitment. 
The project of overlapping consensus depends on a general commitment to 
canons of reasonableness in political discussion and a principle of tolerance 
for divergent moral views which are themselves part of the consensus49 ; 
without it, the task of uncovering principles of justice which may be only 
latent in the various moral conceptions is hopeless. That no such commitment 
exists is obvious; just for instance, plenty of aging New Leftists are really 
(for instance) Marcuseans who long for social and political circumstances 
conducive to putting an end to "repressive tolerance." The disinclination to 
apply sanctions to those like the Northwestern professor who in 1986 dis-
rupted contra leader Adolfo Calero's speech and virtually threatened his life, 
and who was later recommended for tenure by the English Department, sug-
gests that those who are intolerant on principle reside, not just on survivalist 
ranches, but in places of prestige and influence where they elicit much sym-
pathy. Assuming the views of at least some such people constitute moral 
conceptions-and Rawls had better not solve his problem by automatically 
excluding such views from the realm of the moral, given his description of 
the pluralist predicament that is the very inspiration of the new political 
philosophy-what does that philosophy say to them? 
It cannot tease the principle of tolerance out of them by means of ad 
hominem appeals to their own moralities, for the point is that those moralities 
reject tolerance. Nor can it hope to sway them with Kantian arguments about 
respect for persons, since the new philosophy eschews controversy. The re-
maining alternative is to convince them that the alternative to tolerance is an 
oppressive state, and that they would likely be among the oppressed rather 
than the oppressors, since they have little political power. This of course is 
the sort of purely pragmatic argument that Rawls says cannot found an over-
lapping consensus. 
But suppose for the moment that there were an overlapping consensus about 
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tolerance. Can the political justification (in Rawls' sense) of tolerance, or of 
whatever principles of justice emerge from public debate, be any different 
from the one addressed to the New Leftist? No. That justification can assume 
no particular moral conception. And it cannot simultaneously embrace the 
incommensurable principles of all the conceptions current in society; it would 
then be a cacophony that would fail the tests of reasonableness of discussion. 
The only justification left is the Hobbesian one: Let's tolerate each other's 
views, for the alternative is liable to be nasty, brutish and short for each of 
us. Now some might still deny that this is a Hobbesian argument, since it 
seeks an alternative to coercive order. But in light of the notion implicit in 
Hobbes that coercion represents the failure of the sovereign rather than his 
principle means of achieving it, even this weak attempt to put some distance 
between Rawls and Hobbes is suspect. 
Another problem for Rawls is this. Even if we achieve overlapping con-
sensus on the principles of justice, those principles are highly abstract and 
hardly apply themselves. The First Amendment rights concerning religion are 
presently interpreted in ways ranging from Brennan's to the view that those 
rights only forbid preference of one particular religion over another: the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is taken by some to support 
a right to abortion, by others to forbid it; something like Rawls' difference 
principle is invoked by classical liberals like Hayek and by ambitious 
redistributionists. 
There are many similar examples which show that the overlapping consen-
sus, if it exists at all, amounts only to an extremely indeterminate commitment 
not (for whatever reasons) to do anyone down. Political authorities will have 
to do the hard work of deciding what the principles of justice require in 
concrete cases. One approach to this situation is to say, as Ronald Dworkin 
says about hard cases at law, that there is a right answer to each hard case, 
from highly abstract cases like how to apply the difference principle, to the 
design of a constitutional system, to more concrete cases about how to inter-
pret the Bill of Rights. Finding that answer is a matter of interpreting the 
principle in question-say, the difference principle-in a way that puts our 
political tradition in its best light.50 But this route is not open to Rawls, since 
interpretation for Dworkin is a matter of substance as well as fit: the right 
answer is best in the moral sense, and requires the interpreter to employ 
highly controversial principles of political morality. 
The only other way to interpret and apply the public conception of justice 
that is the object of the overlapping consensus is to make the interpretation 
purely conventional: apply it only when there is genuine consensus about its 
application. But, as suggested by the examples just cited, in a pluralistic 
society such agreement is rare, and is liable to be so abstract as to be useless. 
What to do? Stop politics? Certainly not. The alternative seized, at least at 
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the level of constitutional law, by Dworkin, David A. J. Richards, and many 
other Rawls enthusiasts, seems to be the Hobbesian one: decide these ques-
tions in ways that bypass the electoral process. In other words, let the courts 
and those federal agencies which are substantially independent of the elec-
toral process decide. Then tell dissenters that, though of course reasonable 
men and women might disagree about these decisions, someone must decide 
questions of fundamental rights and duties, and that person or body should 
be immune to those majoritarian pressures which incline politicians to dis-
criminate against those whose ways of life are disapproved by the majority. 
This seems the Hobbesian alternative because it appears to give virtually 
unlimited discretion to individuals insulated in large degree from the electoral 
process, i.e., from those whose lives they affect. Now this claim will be 
contested in several ways. It will be said first that interpreting the law in 
order to find the right answer in hard cases, which is what Dworkin's ideal 
judge Hercules supposedly does, is much different from making the law, 
which Hobbes' sovereign inevitably does. But Dworkinian interpretation is 
no different from legislation; as I argue elsewhere,sl neither the legal corpus 
as a whole (including the intent of its various authors) nor popular morality 
nor even the allegedly canonical language of the law limits Hercules, who 
can find substantive rights to abortion in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and even rights against capital punishment in a doc-
ument which explicitly presupposes the death penalty. So my claim that 
Dworkinian "interpretation" of alleged principles of overlapping consensus 
is really legislation stands so far. 
But it will be objected that what aggressive non-elective judicial liberals 
like Dworkin and Richards want is the enforcement of individual rights, 
understood as trumps against collective goals for the protection of individuals 
who might otherwise be treated as inferior by a majority which disapproves 
of their way of life. These rights are meant to protect individual autonomy, 
hardly a Hobbesian ideal. This objection is unconvincing. For "civil rights" 
were originally conceived as protections of individual liberty against the 
state; the central government shall not enforce religion or irreligion; it shall 
not perform arbitrary searches and seizures; it shall not pass bills of attainder; 
the enumeration of the negative rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights shall 
not be construed to disparage those not enumerated .... This reflects an em-
phasis on negative rights as opposed to the sort of rights emphasized by 
contemporary liberals, i.e., positive rights which give the state great discre-
tion to abridge individual liberty in order to confer various benefits on des-
ignated individuals and groups. The Framers' emphasis on negative rights 
reflects their great distrust of central power. Civil rights were liberties, civil 
liberties, liberties the central government could not abridge. Though the Bill 
of Rights disallows congressional infringement on these rights, this was be-
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cause they designed Congress to be the strongest branch of the federal gov-
ernment.52 The Supreme Court was to have nothing like the power it does 
today, as is evidenced by the fact that it took Marbury v. Madison to establish 
the principle of judicial review. One reason for the modest role envisioned 
for the Court was the belief that a powerful judiciary was a great threat to 
civil liberty. 53 
Contrast this conception of civil and constitutional rights with that of Dwor-
kin et al. A fundamental political right is defined by Dworkin as a right not 
to liberty, but to "treatment as an equal,"54 which amounts to the right not to 
have the distribution of goods, to the extent that that distribution is influenced 
by the state, affected by judgments about what ways of life are or are not 
worthy. (All primary goods are subject to redistribution.) We have a right to 
freedom of religion not because religion is (or can be) particularly noble-
that would be perfectionistic-but because we are said to know from our 
general knowledge of society that these freedoms are likely to be abridged 
on perfectionistic grounds if at all. The right is not meant to facilitate the 
pursuit of a worthy life, but to ensure that no one is disadvantaged in the 
distribution of primary goods by adverse judgments about the worth of his 
or her way of life. 
This conception of rights is most consistent with the anti-perfectionism of 
the liberalism I am examining, and illustrates the character of an influential 
kind of contemporary liberal jurisprudence: It virtually trivializes the role of 
freedom in the interpretation of constitutional rights, and is thus in the spirit 
of Hobbes' view that with very few exceptions liberties "depend on the 
silence of the law. "55 No case at all could be made that extensive infringe-
ments of liberty like school busing, or very ambitious redistributive and 
economic planning schemes, violate the rights of those constrained by them, 
so long as such can be construed not to express contempt for those whose 
liberties are infringed. The right to treatment as an equal is at least as likely 
(e.g.) to force the state to distribute food stamps to households of non-related 
individuals as well as more-or-Iess traditional families,56 which extends the 
positive duties of others, as to protect a liberty. This right seems entirely 
compatible with Laurence Tribe's view that constitutional rights, once under-
stood (by the Framers, for instance) as guarantees of liberties, will one day 
be read by the courts to incorporate a doctrine of rights to "affirmative 
governmental protection"-i.e., provision of-the means to "physical sur-
vival and security, health and housing, work and schooling. "57 
Now certainly Christian ethics demands (as did many classical liberals) 
that we have special concern for those who cannot support themselves. But 
it is important to bear in mind the context of the contemporary liberal drive 
for positive rights. Rawls' difference principle, which allows only those social 
and economic inequalities in the basic structure of society that benefit the 
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least advantaged, does not simply require us to provide a decent minimum 
for those who cannot help themselves. The least advantaged here are not 
necessarily poor in an absolute sense; Rawls' is an "ideal theory," and he 
envisions the difference principle governing the "well-ordered" society where 
being disadvantaged is a purely relative state. Yet the Rawlsian state has 
enormous discretion to limit individual liberty in the name of this principle, 
which undermines the repeated claim that liberal justice is concerned above 
all about individual autonomy. The suspicion that the conception of persons 
at work here sees them as patients who need to be taken care of by a vastly 
powerful state is fueled by the fact, discussed earlier, that Rawls rejects 
Kant's conception of persons in favor of the claim that all we do is a product 
of genetic, economic, and social forces. It is this conception which allows 
Rawls to treat all economic goods as if they were manna from heaven (in 
Nozick's well-known phrase), subject to distribution by the state, rather than 
as things produced by agents who might have some prior claims of desert. 58 
Now Rawls in fact has some sympathy for free markets, as Hobbes did, but 
of a purely instrumental sort;59 rights to wealth or income or investment are 
wholly a function of their ability to enhance the prospects of the worst-off in 
accordance with the difference principle. As J. R. Lucas points out, those who 
accomplish much in ways that benefit everyone are entitled in Rawlsian 
society to more than the worst off only on the assumption that they are too 
selfish to produce as much without the incentives the difference principle 
gives them. Were they selfless they would end up with no more primary goods 
than the worst off.60 The better off must be manipulated to provide a com-
modious life for the others. 
Rawls' views about self-respect heighten the suspicion that those taken care 
of by the provider state are not really agents, and so that autonomy really has 
no place in his liberalism. Self-respect in Kant's sense can only be earned.61 
Not so in Rawls' system. He calls self-respect "perhaps the most important 
primary good," for without it one will feel that his or her life plans are worth 
little, and will not "take delight in their execution."62 The liberal state pro-
vides a basis for self-respect by publicly expressing our respect for all. It 
does this by arranging the distribution of primary goods in accordance with 
the two principles of justice. It thus "insure[s persons] a sense of their own 
value."63 Now those principles assume that nobody really earns or deserves 
anything, including good character or any of the primary goods, and that from 
the perspective of politics no life plan is superior to any other. Self-respect 
is entirely unmerited. This "no-fault"64 conception of self-respect, as Clifford 
Orwin calls it, assumes the sort of passive conception of persons that sits 
much more comfortably with Hobbes than with the Christian or Kantian 
traditions. 
This conception of self respect has still more distinctively Hobbesian over-
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tones. For Rawls, one's self-esteem is threatened, even if one is reasonably 
well off, if the idea is abroad that the better off earned their advantages; that 
follows from the claim that self-respect is "insured" by distribution in accor-
dance with principles that recognize no deserved inequalities. Now why 
should that be? What must persons be like for them to respond this way to 
(apparently) merited inequalities? It must hurt them to see others achieve 
eminence which does not redound to their benefit. This sounds like the sort 
of resentment that Leviathan is called upon to quench. Rawls tries hard to 
demonstrate that his principles of justice are not expressions of envy. But I 
see no other explanation of why one cannot "take delight" in his way of life 
and have a sense of self-worth unless one is sure that whatever inequalities 
in primary goods the better-off enjoy increase one's own stock of goods. This 
seems to be an expression of a desire simply to cut the proud down to size, 
'the proud' referring here not just to predatory, selfish types who do the weak 
down, but to anyone whom one fears might have bettered one in any way. 
While an extremely powerful central government is an important part of 
Hobbes' vision of political society, it is the idea that what we dread most is 
losing the race for precedence that is the truly distinguishing mark of Hobbes' 
political philosophy. I fear it marks Rawls', too; in Rawls' well-ordered 
society, we can take satisfaction in knowing that the eminent occupy that 
station at our sufferance. 
But mightn't the principles of justice, especially the difference principle, 
realize in political life Christian humility and charity rather than Hobbesian 
resentment? The point of the theory of justice is that we agree to share one 
another's fate, and that the status of the better off is not indicative of superior 
personal worth. 
There is surely no room for this claim in the later Rawls, whose public 
conception of justice is a Hobbesian modus vivendi. I think it is inconsistent 
with the Theory of Justice Rawls as well. Christian humility enjoins us not 
to be haughty about whatever gifts we have, and to have special concern for 
the poor. But it is a caricature of this ideal of humility to say with Rawls that 
others can demand as a matter of right that all systematic inequalities be 
justified solely in the terms just discussed. Refusal to recognize publicly 
differences in merit is not humility, but vainglory. 
There is another feature of Rawlsian liberalism, implicit in the discussion 
of the difference principle and of the new liberal jurisprudence, which is 
strikingly like Hobbes. I have already mentioned that Rawls' case for free 
markets is purely instrumental. So is his regard for other more-or-Iess spon-
taneous institutions intermediate between the individual and the state. The 
clearest example of this is his attitude toward the family. Rawls sees that his 
doctrine of fair equality of opportunity, which requires that social and eco-
nomic circumstances be manipulated to maximize the prospects of the worse-
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off, seems inconsistent with the family. In a well-known passage he simply 
asserts that, though "the idea of equal opportunity inclines in this direction 
[the abolition of the family] ... within the context of the theory of justice as a 
whole"6s it is not urgent that the family be abolished. There is no argument 
for this reprieve. This is a very shaky defense of the family, but, given his 
various background assumptions about the nature of persons and the role of 
the state, Rawls can do no better. In this respect he resembles Hobbes, who 
does not demand the abolition of intermediate institutions, but who leaves 
them at the mercy of Leviathan nonetheless. 
IV. Conclusion 
I have argued that at the level of concrete political decisions such as Su-
preme Court cases, and at the level of abstract political theory, a powerful 
movement within contemporary liberalism is essentially Hobbesian; it evi-
dences a hostility to religion and a conception of persons similar to Hobbes'. 
I want to close this essay by denying one point of resemblance between 
Hobbes and liberals of this type. I believe that Hobbes dissembles when he 
uses traditional moral language, most notably about natural rights, in a rad-
ically new way to justify Leviathan. I do not think this is intended by most 
liberals. Rather I think their fundamental philosophical presuppositions about 
persons and the world around them are inconsistent with moral ideals to 
which they have a deep sentimental attachment. The moral ideals they profess 
are cut flowers that cannot survive outside their native soil, which was nour-
ished by the fusion of the Christian and classical traditions. The death of these 
ideals is becoming more apparent. Christians have cause to wonder whether 
a society governed by the new liberalism can be hospitable to their beliefs. 
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